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North-Holland 
Letter to the Editor 
COMMENTS ON "A DEFICIENCY OF NATURAL DEDUCTION" 111 
Dear sir, 
I think it is appropriate that a word of comment 
be made on Wiltink's article [11. The author of this 
article aims at pointing out that Gentzcn's ystem 
of Natural Deduction cannot live up to its claim 
to provide for efficient formalization of mathe- 
matical proofs. Whether Natural Deduction is ac- 
tually stated for such a formalization may be 
disputable, but the way the author goes about 
stating his case is, in my opinion, certainly dispu- 
table, and in some aspects even wrong. What 
makes Wiltink's article hard to understand is the 
following. Apparently, he wants to offer an alter- 
native proof system providing for ,zhorter and 
more efficient proofs than Oossible it, Natural 
Deduction, but he does so without giving any 
explicit reference to what his proof system actt'- 
ally ;:~otm:s to: ti~ere is no mention of the syntax, 
of the axioms, nor of the inference rules employed 
in his logic. It is this complete lack of explicitness 
that makes it almost impossible to evaluate the 
merits of ~,i~ work. 
In oh, o~ his examplc~, tl,e author off¢-'~ a 
(short) proof ma2~r,g use of properties of (logical) 
equivalence (such as associativity and reflexivity). 
Apparently, the kind of logical system the author 
has in mind is based on this special ogical con- 
nective. He also claims that it is a defect of 
Natural Deduction that it does not handle equiv- 
alence efficiently, one reason being that, in Natu- 
ral Deduction, equivalence is a defined construct 
(for example, a conjunction of implications). For 
two reasons this is not a fair argument. First of all 
(as already mentioned above), the author should 
give a full axiomatization of his version of predi- 
cate logic to actually demonstr~te hat predicate 
logic can be suitably based on logical equivalence 
instead of implication. Without such a compara- 
tive formalization, further discussion scems rather 
senseless. In the second place, Natural Deduction 
in its primitive axiomatized form offers a frame- 
work for manipulating basic constructs from which 
properties of defined constructs (such as equiv- 
alence) can be der.;ved in a sometimes lengthy but 
straightforward manner. (This is, in fact, the major 
strong-point of Gentzen's ystem: it is one of the 
few known axiomatizations of first-order predicate 
logic in which syntactical proofs can actually be 
carried out in a more-or-less straightforward and 
intuitively simple manner.) The basic Natural De- 
duction system enhanced with such derived prop- 
erties (theorems in Natural Deduction) can then 
provide for a powerful framework (by means of a 
meta-theorem known as "substitution for eqniw 
alences'), in which finding proofs of new proper- 
ties can be in~cnenscly shortened. 
In another ex~,,nple, tile aulhor asks h)r a shot1 
proof of the follow?ng problem: from A -= B con- 
clude that A v C ~ B v C. in the Natural Deduc- 
Gon system enhanced with the above-mentioned 
substitution rule, the result follows immediately, 
so no real problem here. Wiltink, in his article, 
proposes a completely different approach: he 
makes an appeal to the so-called rule of Lcib~lz! 
But this rule, employing quantification o'ser fuuc- 
tion symbols, is a construct fr3m second-order 
predicate logic, which is a completely different 
game! Gentzen's ystem of Natural Deduction is 
aimed at a:domatizing ]irst-order predicate logic, 
hence an appeal to Leibniz' rule is quite out of 
place. 
I agree with Wihink that proofs in the basic 
Natural Deduction system are sometimes rather 
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le1:gth,, but. in an enhanced system as described 
above, the lengths of these proofs can usually be 
cut down subs{antiaHy. I do not agree with Wiltink 
tha* he has offered insight in constructing actual 
sborter proofs, since he fails in providing anything 
~ear az~ ai~ernati;'e formalization of  first-order 
predica:e logic. 
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